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Anti-Counterfeiting for Polymer Banknotes Based
on Polymer Substrate Fingerprinting
Shen Wang, Ehsan Toreini, and Feng Hao, Senior member, IEEE
Abstract—Polymer banknotes are the trend for printed cur-
rency and have been adopted by more than fifty countries
worldwide. However, over the past years, the quantity of polymer
counterfeits has been increasing, so has the quality of counterfeits.
This shows that the initial advantage of bringing a new polymer
technology to fight against counterfeiting is reducing. To maintain
one step ahead of counterfeiters, we propose a novel anti-
counterfeiting technique called Polymer Substrate Fingerprinting
(PSF). Our technique is built based on the observation that
the opacity coating, a critical step during the production of
polymer notes, is a stochastic manufacturing process, leaving
uneven thickness in the coating layer and the random dispersion
of impurities from the ink. The imperfections in the coating
layer result in random translucent patterns when a polymer
banknote is back-lit by a light source. We show these patterns
can be reliably captured by a commodity negative-film scanner
and processed into a compact fingerprint to uniquely identify
each banknote. Using an extensive dataset of 6,200 sample
images collected from 340 UK banknotes, we show that our
method can reliably authenticate banknotes, and is robust against
rough daily handling of banknotes. Furthermore, we show the
extracted fingerprints contain around 900 bits of entropy, which
makes it extremely scalable to identify every polymer note
circulated globally. As compared with previous or existing anti-
counterfeiting mechanisms for banknotes, our method has a
distinctive advantage: it ensures that even in the extreme case
when counterfeiters have procured the same printing equipment
and ink as used by a legitimate government, counterfeiting
banknotes remains infeasible because of the difficulty to replicate
a stochastic manufacturing process.
Index Terms—Banknote, Fingerprint, Counterfeiting, Biomet-
rics, PUF.
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the increasing volume of transactions made by
credit cards and electronic payment methods, banknotes still
play a crucial role in our society. In many countries, such as the
US, the UK, Canada, Australia, and the European Union, the
demand for cash continues to grow with the value of banknotes
in circulation increasing each year typically by a factor of
5 to 10 percent [1]. Globally, there are over 500 billion
banknotes in circulation. According to a report by McKinsey
& Company [2], over the past years, although the share of the
world’s transactions carried out in cash has fallen, banknotes
remain one of the most widely used payment instruments in
the world.
Counterfeiting, or the forgery of banknotes, has been a
major threat to the society and economy. Since most banknotes
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cost little to produce, a successful forgery is virtually all profit.
People who fall victim to this crime are essentially robbed.
Their losses cannot be reimbursed as doing so will facilitate
the circulation of counterfeits and encourage illegal activities.
Widespread counterfeiting can severely undermine the value
of the currency, and disrupt the economic development [3].
In general, anti-counterfeiting methods challenge the forger
in two main aspects: the substrate, and the printing. Traditional
banknotes use a paper substrate made of cotton and linen.
Compared with the bond paper made of wooden particles, the
cotton/linen paper is substantially more expensive and more
durable. When used for banknotes, it also contains various
security features which are introduced during the manufactur-
ing process, such as watermark, embossed metallic thread and
other unique features. The printing is another aspect that gives
banks an edge against counterfeiting. It requires specialised
equipment and ink which are prohibitively expensive for
counterfeiters. One of the most important printing techniques
is the so-called intaglio (gravure) printing, which gives the
raised print and the unique texture feel of a banknote [3].
The latest development in banknotes is to print them on
polymer: a thin, flexible plastic [3]. The new polymer substrate
not only supports traditional security printing as employed for
paper notes, but also allows enhanced security features, such as
see-through window and foil patch. This makes them harder
to counterfeit than paper notes. Since the first introduction
in Australia in 1988, they have become the trend for printed
currency and have been adopted by more than fifty countries.
In the UK, Bank of England first issued polymer £5 and £10
in 2016 and 2017, respectively. It has started replacing £20
with polymer notes since 2020.
The introduction of polymer banknotes has evidently re-
duced counterfeiting. For example, after Australia fully re-
placed paper banknotes with polymer series in 1996, the rate
of counterfeits fell noticeably from 16 ppm (parts per million
- the number of counterfeits per million genuine banknotes in
circulation) in 1996 to only 3 ppm in 2000 [4].
However, counterfeiters have been catching up. After 2000,
the counterfeiting rate in Australia gradually increased, and
reached above 25 ppm in 2015 [4]. As the quantity of
counterfeits increases, so does the quality. While the first
recorded counterfeits on polymer were detected in 1997, they
were printed on a paper substrate and used techniques only
to simulate the feel of polymer. Around 2010, polymer coun-
terfeits began to appear by using advanced technologies that
enabled counterfeiters to print large volumes of counterfeits on
a plastic film. This shows that the initial advantage of bringing
a new polymer technology to fight against counterfeiting is
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reducing.
Although polymer banknotes have many existing anti-
counterfeiting features, one fundamental limitation for the se-
curity assurance of those features is that they critically rely on
the difficulty for counterfeiters to obtain the same or equivalent
printing equipment and ink. As shown by the example of [5],
professional counterfeiters often exploit weaknesses in the
supply chain for the manufacturing of banknotes and obtain
from worldwide suppliers essentially the same or equivalent
printing equipment and ink as used for printing genuine notes.
Their chance of success can be significantly boosted when
the operation is backed by a state government. For example,
many high-quality counterfeits of the US$100 bill, known
as “superdollars”, are allegedly made by countries that are
antagonistic toward the USA. Some of the counterfeits are of
such high quality that, according to Europol, they “are just
U.S. dollars not made by the U.S. government” [6]. In face of
such professional counterfeiters backed by a state government,
existing security features of a banknote can be easily bypassed.
To maintain one step ahead of forgers, we propose a
new anti-counterfeiting technique called Polymer Substrate
Fingerprinting (PSF). In contrast to existing banknote se-
curity features which require delicate design and printing,
our technique exploits the stochastic nature of the polymer
substrate manufacturing process. It works by analysing the
random translucent patterns of the polymer substrate when it
is back-lit. These patterns are caused by stochastic printing
and the randomly dispersed impurities in the ink during the
opacity coating procedure. They naturally occur during the
banknote production, and cannot be precisely controlled or
duplicated. We show these patterns can be reliably captured
by a commodity film scanner and processed into a compact
fingerprint to uniquely and reliably identify each banknote.
Our contributions are summarised as follows. First, we
propose Polymer Substrate Fingerprinting (PSF), a novel anti-
counterfeiting technique for polymer banknotes based on
analysing the naturally occurring, unique, and unrepeatable
imperfections in the opacity coating layer of a polymer sub-
strate. Second, we present a proof-of-concept implementation
that uses a commodity negative-film scanner to capture those
imperfections by photographing the random translucent pat-
terns of a polymer substrate when it is back-lit and trans-
forming them into a compact fingerprint for authentication.
Third, we collect an extensive dataset using the UK polymer
banknotes and conduct experiments to show that our technique
can reliably authenticate banknotes with high accuracy, is
robust again rough daily handling, and is highly scalable to
identity every polymer banknote circulated in the world.
II. PRODUCTION OF POLYMER BANKNOTE
While the world’s first banknote printed on clear plastic
film was issued in Australia in 1988, this was the result of
nearly twenty years of research and development. The major
breakthrough in the field was the invention of a special type of
plastic called biaxially-oriented polypropylene (BOPP), which
after being covered with opacity coating allows quality print-
ing of all of the security features that are printed on traditional
paper notes [7]. The use of BOPP makes the polymer banknote
highly durable, as well as being waterproof and dirt-resistant.
A polymer note starts as clear plastic heads, which are
melted down at a high temperature (around 166 °C) and then
blown into a large bubble of several storeys high. The walls of
the bubble are pressed together and cooled to form a laminated
polymer film. A layer of opacity coating will be added to allow
printing security features on the polymer film.
The opacity coating process applies white ink to the film
to make it opaque, except for areas that are left clear as
see-through windows. The see-through window is a security
feature applied on the polymer note as it forces a forger to
use clear plastic film as the substrate, which requires more
advanced printing equipment than a paper substrate.
The technique used for opacity coating is called gravure
printing. Figure 1 shows an overview of the process. The
substrate is pressed against the inked cylinder on a rotary press
between a backing roller and a gravure roller. The cylinder is
etched with small cells on the edge which hold the ink fetched
from a liquid pool. When the cylinder is partially immersed
in the liquid pool, it picks up ink to fill its recessed cells on
each rotation of the press. A flexible blade (also known as the
“doctor blade”) is used to remove any excess ink from the
printing cylinder, leaving ink only in the cells.
At a microscopic view, the opaque ink layer after the
gravure printing process is highly non-uniform, showing ran-
dom variations in the thickness, as shown in Figure 1(b). This
is due to two main reasons. The first is related to air bubbles.
When the ink in the cell is transferred to the substrate under the
pressed contact, air meniscuses penetrate the gap and become
air bubbles trapped in the ink [8]. Due to the air bubbles,
the ink transferring process is only partially performed. The
second reason is related to the solid residues. After the ink
is transferred to the substrate, the remaining liquid in the cell
evaporates, leaving a solid substance. The substance adhering
to the bottom of the cell reduces the volume of the container.
As a result of a combined effect of air bubbles and solid
residues, the opaque link layer is highly uneven. The uneven
coating layer causes the polymer substrate to exhibit random
translucent patterns when it is back-lit by a light source,
which we will demonstrate later. The existence of impurities
in the ink adds further randomness to these patterns. All these
are the imperfections from the opacity coating process, and
they constitute the physical basis for the anti-counterfeiting
technique that we propose in this paper.
After the white ink coating, the polymer substrate is ready
for the subsequent printing of security features. Our technique
does not rely on any of the printed security features, however
we describe the process here for completeness. Security print-
ing involves several layers of printing applied in sequence.
The first is offset litho, which uses an offset roller to transfer
ink to the polymer substrate and puts the basic pattern of the
banknote in place. This is followed by intaglio printing, which
is used to put the major design elements such as the portrait
and narrative elements (e.g., Her Majesty the Queen on a £10
note). The next is letterpress, which prints letter and digits
including the unique serial number. The subsequent stage is
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Fig. 1: Schematic of the Gravure printing process
diffraction gratings, which typically consist of 12,000 lines
per centimetre coated with a thin film of a reflecting metal
(e.g., aluminium). Light is diffracted from the lines to give
changing colours when viewed from different angles. Next, a
protective over-coating ink (clear varnish) is applied on both
sides of the note to protect the printed design from dirt and
solvent. The tactile features are then applied to assist the
visually impaired to identify different denominations. Finally,
the printed sheets are guillotined into individual banknotes.
Each banknote is then electronically inspected to ensure their
quality fulfils the required standard. More details about the
polymer note production can be found in [7].
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION
A. Feature Area
First of all, we need to identify an area on the polymer
banknote for feature extraction. Based on the observation that
the opacity coating is a stochastic process, the ideal areas for
feature extraction are those that are directly exposed from the
opacity coating and not obstructed by the subsequent security
printing. Therefore, for £10 notes, we choose an area between
the “Ten” hologram and the see-through window as shown
in Figure 2 (a). To locate the area precisely, we use two
auxiliary markers: the pound sign in the see-through window
and the silver foil patch contained in the hologram. Both
are metallic images made by diffraction grating printing at
extremely high precision (around 12,000 lines of thin metal
film coated per centimetre). These images are darker than
the surroundings. Hence, they can be easily separated from
the background. Based on the detected markers, the feature
area is automatically located with the same position and
dimension. Figure 2 (b) displays the snapshots of the same
feature area from three different polymer £10 notes when they
are back-lit by a light source. These pictures exhibit random
translucent patterns, which we will process later. Similarly,
we identify and locate the feature areas on a polymer £5
note and a paper £20 note as shown in Figure 2 (c) and
(a) Feature area on £10 note (19.3mm⇥ 5mm)
(b) Feature areas on different £10 notes
(c) Feature area on £5 note (3.3mm⇥ 13mm)
(d) Feature area on £20 note (16.2mm⇥ 16.2mm)
Fig. 2: Feature extraction on different banknotes (the zoomed-
in pictures are cropped as a square from the original images
for demonstration)
(d), respectively. Here we choose the paper £20 note as an
example for comparison. When back-lit, a paper banknote also
shows translucent patterns, but they are caused by the random
interleaving of the cotton linens rather than the uneven coating
as seen in a polymer note. Although we focus on the anti-
counterfeiting for polymer notes, our technique can also be
applied to prevent forgery of paper notes. The performance of
our fingerprinting technique for these two different substrates
will be compared in the evaluation section.
B. Experiment Setup
To capture the random translucent patterns of the polymer
substrate when it is back-lit, we choose an off-the-shelf
negative film scanner (Epson V850), as shown in Figure 3.
The resolution of the scanner is set to 3200 dpi to obtain
high-resolution images with the help of an embedded back-
light. In our experiments, we use a film-frame to hold the
banknote. The frame helps to keep the banknote flat and in
position during the scanning process.
The primary reason for using a negative-film scanner instead
of a more common flatbed scanner is that the former is
specifically designed to scan a film by shining light through
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(a) Scanner (b) Modified frame (c) Scanner set
Fig. 3: Scanner setup
(a) Camera (b) Camera/Light-box (c) Camera set
Fig. 4: Camera setup
it, while using light sensors to capture the image on the other
side. This fits precisely our purpose. On the contrary, a flatbed
scanner scans an object using reflective light. In the UK and
other countries, it is prohibited to scan a banknote in this way
as it may allow a casual counterfeiter to produce a fake copy.
In fact, the firmware of a flatbed scanner has an embedded
function to search for anti-copy patterns, e.g., EURion constel-
lation [9] printed on banknotes. Once the scanner finds such
patterns, it will stop the scanning process. By contrast, with the
film scanner, when the light shines through the £10 banknote,
the EURion pattern has been blended into the background. As
a result, the obtained image is extremely “noisy”, and totally
unsuitable for counterfeiting. On the other hand, the “noise”
or the randomness in the image is exactly what we need for
building an anti-counterfeiting system.
For the purpose of comparison and evaluation, we also build
a second prototype using an off-the-shelf camera (Panasonic
DMC-FZ72) and a light-box, as shown in Figure 4. A piece of
glass is covered on top of the banknote to keep it flat. A light-
box brightens up the banknote from the underneath so that the
camera can photograph the translucent patterns on the top at
a close distance (about 2 cm). The aperture of the camera is
fixed at 5.0 and the shutter speed at 1/100. This combination
provides sufficient depth of field as well as stability to get a
clear and sharp image. The shooting mode is set to “Macro”
to capture the details of random patterns in a close-up.
C. Image Processing
After we photograph a back-lit polymer banknote, the image
is cropped to contain only the feature area, which is located
by the aide of auxiliary markers. The cropped image is further
processed by applying 2-D Gabor filters into a compact 2048-
bit binary code, which we call a polymer substrate fingerprint.
Details of this process are explained below.
1) Gabor Filter Selection: Two-dimensional Gabor filters
are a common technique used to analyse the textural patterns
of an image. They have been commonly employed in bio-
metric applications such as iris and face [10]. A 2-D Gabor
filter comprises a sinusoidal wave modulated by a Gaussian
envelope. It efficiently detects the edges and textural patterns
existing in a 2-D image by capturing features in both frequency
and spatial domains. This allows the output of the 2-D Gabor
filter to be used in distinguishing whether the two snapshots
are originally from the same pattern. In our work, we only
need it to work in the spatial domain. In this domain, a 2-D
Gabor filter is described as below [10]:













0 = x cos (✓) + y sin (✓)
y
0 =  x sin (✓) + y cos (✓),
(1)
where F is the central frequency of the sinusoidal wave, ✓ is
the angle between the direction of the wave and the x axis of
the spatial domain, e is the natural exponential function,   and
⌘ are the standard deviations of the Gaussian envelope in the
direction of the wave and orthogonal to it, respectively. The
parameters   and ⌘ represent the shape factors of the Gaussian
surface, and are also called the smoothing parameters. They
determine the selectivity of the filter in the spatial domain.
Different combinations of the Gabor filter parameters are
capable to extract different textural features. However, there is
no unified way to determine values for these parameters [10],
as they depend on particular characteristics of the textural pat-
terns to be extracted [11]. To efficiently select the combination,
a matrix called a Gabor filter-bank is created that contains a
range of frequencies and orientations of Gabor filters. Each
individual frequency in the matrix is called a scale, which is
calculated from a maximum frequency, known as f max. For a





u 1 , 8u 2 {1, 2, . . . , U}. (2)





⇡, 8v 2 {1, 2, . . . , V }. (3)
Suitable parameters for the Gabor filters can be determined
by using an iterated process through experiments [10]. Once a
suitable set of parameters is found, it can be used for the same
type of textural patterns (e.g., using the same set of parameters
for processing all human irises in iris recognition).
When choosing the values for the Gabor filter parameters,
we have three main considerations. First of all, we consider
the decidability [12], which measures how far the clustering of
samples from the same source is statistically separated from
the clustering of samples from different sources. Clearly, the
decidability should be sufficiently large. Second, we consider
the fractional Hamming distance (HD), which represents the
percentage of bits that are different on corresponding bit
positions between two binary strings. In the rest of the paper,
we will use HD as a shorthand to refer to fractional Hamming
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Fig. 5: Physical dimension of the Gabor filter
distance. The HD between samples from different polymer
notes should ideally centre around 0.5. As we will show in
the evaluation, centring around 0.5 will greatly simplify our
analysis as the obtained binary fingerprint can be modelled as a
series of Bernoulli trials. Third, after the image processing, the
obtained polymer fingerprint should contain sufficiently high
entropy. A high entropy (say more than 128 bits) will statically
guarantee that the chance for a random polymer substrate
to successfully pass the verification is negligible. In fact, as
we will demonstrate, we are able to achieve much higher
entropy (900 bits) in the extracted fingerprints. Based on these
requirements and the selection method outlined in [10], we
conduct empirical experiments based on 100 samples from a
set of randomly chosen £10 banknotes and determine that a
suitable set of parameters for extracting the random translucent
patterns for a polymer substrate is f max = 0.25,   =
p
2, ⌘ =p
2. The values for the scale and orientation that give the best
overall performance are u = 5 and U = 6 for computing the
scale (Equation 2) and v = 11 and V = 30 for computing the
orientation (Equation 3). This setting is the same for both £5
and £10 as the textural patterns are the same. For paper notes,
we use a different combination: u = 6 and U = 6 for the scale,
and v = 22 and V = 25 for the orientation. The parameters
are slightly different because of the different textural patterns
exhibited by a paper note (see Figure 2 (d)).
The size of the Gabor filter applied on the scanned polymer
banknote is 101 ⇥ 101 (unit: pixel). Given the resolution of
the scanner being 3200 dpi, each pixel in the scanned sample
corresponds to about 7.94 µm (1/3200 inch). For 101 pixels,
that corresponds to a physical size of 101 ⇥ 7.94 = 802
µm on the banknote. According to Equation 2, the frequency
of the Gaussian envelope applied on the polymer banknote
is a quarter of f max. Therefore, the wavelength is 16 pixels,
equating to 127 µm as shown in Figure 5.
2) Feature Extraction and Comparison: With the 2-D Ga-
bor filter defined above, we apply it to process the translucent
patterns photographed from the feature area of a polymer note
into a binary string of 2048 bits, similar to how an iris-code
is generated from the textural patterns of an iris image in
iris recognition [12]. First of all, a captured photograph is
grey-scaled, and a 2-D Gabor filter kernel is applied on the
converted image to obtain a matrix of complex numbers. Each
pixel in the image is transformed into a complex number.
Given an input image I(x, y) of dimensions X ⇥ Y and a
bank of discrete Gabor filters Gmn(x, y) with m 2 {1, ..,M}
and n 2 {1, .., N}, the complex number matrix C(x, y) is
TABLE I: Summary of Datasets
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I(a, b)Gmn(x  a, y   b), (4)
where ¯ denotes the complex conjugate.
Because the values of adjacent pixels are usually highly
correlated, we perform a down-sampling process in order to
remove the correlation. Values in every 20th rows and 20th
columns are selected to form a new matrix sized 32 ⇥ 32.
All elements in the matrix are complex numbers with real
and imaginary parts. Each element is then decoded into 2 bits
depending on which quadrant does the complex number falls
into. This gives a binary output of 32 ⇥ 32 ⇥ 2 = 2048 bits,
which we call a “polymer substrate fingerprint”.
The similarity between two polymer substrate fingerprints,
denoted as f1 and f2, is measured by computing a fractional





This is similar to how iris-codes are compared in iris
recognition [12], however, in the case of the iris, there is a
2048-bit mask vector in addition to a 2048-bit iris-code. The
purpose of the mask is to filter out unreliable bit positions
caused by artefacts such as eyelids and eyelashes from the
HD computation. In our system, we carefully select a feature
area that is not obstructed or interfered by artefacts such as
holograms and other printed security features. This removes
the need for a mask. Hence, the stored data is only half the
size of an iris-code. In the ideal case, the HD between any two
fingerprints extracted from the same banknote should be close
to 0, and the HD between fingerprints extracted from different
banknotes should be close to 0.5. In the sections below, we
will systematically evaluate the HD comparison results.
IV. DATASETS
We collect an extensive set of samples from the UK ban-
knotes of different denominations, under different conditions.
In total, we have collected 8 datasets containing 6,200 sample
images, taken from 340 different banknotes, including 140 £10
notes, 100 £5 notes and 100 £20 notes. These datasets can
be divided into three groups: benchmark, robustness test and
variation test, as summarised in Table I.
A. Benchmark
The dataset in the benchmark group is collected in a
favourable condition. It consists of 100 different £10 polymer
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notes with 10 image samples for each note, making it a total of
1,000 samples. Each sample banknote is sandwiched between
two pieces of thin clear glasses in the aligned frame during
the scanning process. The use of the frame helps constrain the
banknote in the correct orientation.
B. Robustness Test
Rotation. As part of the robustness test, we rotate the
banknote and use the auxiliary markers to automatically re-
orient the image before processing. This is done in Matlab.
We collect 10 samples per each banknote from the same £10
banknotes used in the benchmark set, after rotating each note
by a different angle varying from  10° to 10°. Testing rotation
within this range is sufficient for our purpose as in practice
errors of mismatch occur by only a small rotation angle. In
the two dimensional space, given coordinates of two points
(x1, y1) and (x2, y2) in a Cartesian coordinate system, the





The angle of the rotation ↵ for each sample image is
computed based on the centres of the two auxiliary markers.
Then the image is rotated accordingly.
Scribbling. Under the Currency and Banknotes Act 1928 in
the UK, it is prohibited to scribble on the surface of banknotes
as that may deface the notes. Therefore, we use hairs and
fibres attached to the surface of each £10 banknote used in
the benchmark dataset to mimic the same effect of scribbling
when the banknote is photographed.
Soaking. Sometimes a banknote may drop into water by
accident, or get wet (e.g, by rain) during the daily usage.
Because every polymer banknote is protected by a over-coating
layer (varnish) as part of the production process, a polymer
note is water-resistant by design. Nonetheless, we use twenty
randomly selected £10 to conduct a soaking test, with one
sample for each note taken before the test and four samples
taken after the test. These banknotes are soaked in water for
2 minutes and then dried naturally on a flat surface for 30
minutes before they are scanned and processed.
Folding. In daily life, banknotes are often folded before
being put in a wallet. We conduct a test to study the effect
of folding on our method. Initially, we take a set of randomly
selected £10 notes, fold each note in half and store them in a
daily used wallet for three days. Afterwards, the folded notes
are flattened with the images of the feature area taken. Next,
we fold each banknote twice along the long side to make it
more compact for storage in the wallet. The double folded
banknotes are put in the wallet for another three days before
they are flattened and scanned. The folding dataset consists of
100 sample images taken from twenty £10 with one sample of
the original note, two samples after folding once, and another
two samples after folding twice.
C. Variation Test
Alternative Equipment. Instead of a film scanner, we use
a camera and a light-box to photograph the same 100 £10
notes used in the benchmark set with 10 images for each note.
Film scanners and cameras are two different types of optical
imaging devices, using different physical mechanisms. A film
scanner obtains an image by moving a bar of light sensors
alongside the surface of a flat film with a light shining on
the opposite side of the film, while a camera flashes an array
of light sensors in one go. Despite having a slow developing
speed, the scanner tends to capture a high-quality edge-to-edge
image. The reason is that it has a relatively simple optical
structure with only one flat protective screen being laid on
top of the sensor, while for a camera, light needs to pass
through 4 to 7 lenses before reaching the sensors. The polymer
fingerprints obtained from using these two different devices
will be compared in the valuation section.
Different Denominations. The £5 and £10 banknotes use
essentially the same polymer substrate. Under the microscopic
view, we observe similar random translucent patterns in the
opacity coating layer for both £5 and £10 notes. To study the
variation between these notes of different denominations, we
use the film scanner to photograph 100 £5 polymer notes with
10 samples per note, and compare them against the benchmark
set. We use the same Gabor filter setting for £5 as used for
£10 in the benchmark dataset.
Different Substrates. To study of the variation between a
polymer substrate and a paper substrate, we randomly choose
100 £20 paper notes. The paper £20 note in the UK uses a
paper substrate made of cotton and linen. We use the same film
scanner to image 100 £20 notes with 10 samples per banknote.
As we will show in the evaluation, although our technique is
designed for the anti-counterfeiting of polymer notes, it can
be easily adapted to prevent forgery of paper notes as well.
V. EVALUATION
A. Framework
Our polymer substrate fingerprinting technique is closely
related to the technology of biometrics which authenticates
people based on their inherent physical or behavioural fea-
tures. Here, we authenticate a polymer banknote based on
its inherent physical properties in the polymer substrate. On
the other hand, our method is also related to the field of
physically unclonable function (PUF), which provides security
assurance based on the impossibility to physically clone a
physical object. However, biometrics and PUF generally use
different evaluation metrics despite that the two are inherently
related. Based on earlier work [11], we propose to use a unified
framework that combines both biometrics and PUFs metrics
for evaluating our polymer substrate fingerprinting system.
1) Biometrics: A biometric system authenticates people
based on their unique physical or behavioural features [12].
The performance of a biometric, especially one that uses HD
for comparison, is commonly evaluated in terms of decidabil-
ity, degree of freedom, and error rates as explained below.
Decidability. In a biometric system, there are two groups
of biometric data distributions: the intra-group that refers to
the distances between samples from the same subject and the
inter-group that refers to the distances between samples from
different subjects. In this paper, we use fractional Hamming
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TABLE II: Notations used in PUF metrics. (In the benchmark
dataset, S = 100, L = 2048 and T = 10)
f Feature vector
S Total number of banknotes
s Index of each banknote (1  s  S)
L Bit Length of the feature vector from each banknote
l Index of each bit position in a feature vector (1  l  L)
T Total number of samples measured per banknote
t Index of each sample (1  t  T )
distance (HD) as an example of the distance metric. Clearly
the two distributions should be as further apart as possible.
We use the decidability metric [12] to measures how far the
two distributions are separated. This metric is denoted d0 and









where  1 and  2 are the standard deviations of distances
between samples from the intra-group and the inter-group,
respectively, µ1 and µ2 are the mean values from these two
groups. |·| denotes the absolute value.
Degree of Freedom. The number of degrees of freedom
(DoF) is a metric that measures how many independent bits
exist in a biometric instance. In our systems, the more degrees
of freedom contained in the extracted feature vectors, the more
statistically unlikely it will be for any two random feature





where µ is the mean of the HD in the inter-group, and   is
the standard deviation of the HD in this group.
Error Rates. In a biometric verification system, there are
two types of error rates: a false rejection rate (FRR) and a
false acceptance rate (FAR). FRR refers to the probability
that a genuine sample is falsely rejected, while FAR refers
to the probability that a fake sample is falsely accepted. For
practical purposes, both FRR and FAR should be kept as small
as possible (ideally 0%). In reality, they vary according to
the choice of a threshold. Increasing the threshold can reduce
FRR but often at the expense of increasing FAR. Commonly
an equal error rate (EER), where the curves of FRR and FAR
intersect, is used to indicate the overall error rate performance
of a biometric system.
2) Physical Unclonable Function: Physical Unclonable
Function (PUF) is a security primitive built upon the difficulty
of replicating the same physical properties of an object or
device. Maiti et al. [13] proposed a framework to evaluate the
performance of PUF. We adapt their framework as part of the
metrics used to evaluate the performance of our system in the
following three dimensions: space, time, and device. Notations
used in this framework are summarised in Table II.
Space Dimension - Uniformity, Randomness. In the space
dimension, we assess how uniform the 0s and 1s are distributed
in a feature vector and how random the binary values are at

















Time Dimension – Reliability, Steadiness. In the time
dimension, we assess the similarity of samples taken at differ-
ent times from the same banknote. Reliability measures how
consistent a feature vector from a banknote is as compared
with other feature vectors taken in different times from the
same banknote. Steadiness measures how stable the value at































Device Dimension – Uniqueness, Bit-Aliasing. In the de-
vice dimension, we consider the diversity of the feature vectors
taken from different banknotes. Uniqueness measures how
distinguishable a feature vector is from other feature vectors
extracted from different banknotes. Bit-aliasing measures how
likely different banknotes are to produce identical values at
the same bit positions in the feature vector.
Uniqueness(s) =
2
























1) Benchmark Performance: Based on the benchmark
dataset, we compute pair-wise HDs between the feature vec-
tors obtained from the same banknotes (intra-group) and from
different banknotes (inter-group). The histograms for the two
groups of HD calculations are plotted in Figure 6.
Biometric Metrics. From Figure 6, the inter-group and
intra-group HD distributions are clearly separated. Based on
Equation 7, we calculate the decidability d0 = 29, which is
much larger than the reported d0 = 14 from iris codes [12].
One main reason for the higher decidability in our system is
that we photograph the random features of a polymer substrate
at an extremely close distance (1-2 cm), but this is not possible
with the iris scanner as that would be too invasive to a human.
For the inter-group HD distributions, we obtain the mean
HD µ = 0.500 with a standard deviation   = 0.017. Based on
Equation 8, we are able to calculate the number of degrees of
freedom N = 900. To confirm that N accurately reflects the
number of degrees of freedom for the actual polymer finger-
prints, we plot a bionomial distribution curve which models a
series of 900 Bernoulli trials (i.e., tossing an unbiased coin)
9
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Binomial Distribution
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Fig. 6: HD distributions of Benchmark dataset. Decidability
d0 ⇡ 29.
with a probability of 0.5 for each trial. As shown in Figure 6,
this binomial distribution curve fits perfectly the HD histogram
in the inter-group. This corroborates the fact that the obtained
2048-bit fingerprints from the polymer banknotes have 900
degrees of freedom, or in other words 900 bits entropy. By
comparison, the number of the degrees of freedom for a 2048-
bit iris code is only 249 [12]. Note that the iris textural patterns
tend to be correlated along the radial directions [12], which
reduces the entropy of the iris codes, while such correlations
do not exist in the polymer substrate. This, together with the
fact that we can take a close-up of the polymer substrate at
an extremely short distance, contributes to the much higher
entropy in the extracted polymer substrate fingerprints than in
iris-codes. The intra-group HD distributions do not show the
same symmetric shape as the inter-group HD distributions as
they heavily depend on the noise in the data acquisition. A few
noisy samples can result in relatively high intra-group HDs for
the same banknotes, leaving a long trail in the distribution.
From Figure 6, it is clear that the two groups of distributions
are far apart. If we choose an HD value 0.33 as the threshold,
the FRR and FAR will be both 0%. Obviously the EER for the
overall performance is also fixed at an ideal value 0%.
PUF Metrics. In Section V-A2, we have defined a set of
metrics to evaluate PUF. Table III summarises the performance
of polymer substrate fingerprints using those metrics due to
Maiti et al. [13] along with other related PUFs proposed in
the past work for comparison. As shown in Table III, our
technique achieves results close to the ideal values in each
of these metrics. Overall the results also compare favourably
in general to the state-of-the-art PUF systems reported in the
literature [11], [13].
2) Robustness Tests: For ease of illustration, we plot HD
histograms for different robustness test cases as fitted curves
in Figure 7. We explain each case below.
Rotated Dataset. As shown in Figure 7, rotation has
little effect on the performance as the software is able to
automatically re-orient a banknote image based on auxiliary
TABLE III: PUF metrics from Benchmark dataset
PUF Ideal Bench. Paper Arbiter Ring Oscilator
Metrics Value Dataset PUF [11] PUF [13] PUF [13]
Uniformity 0.5 0.500 0.466 0.556 0.505
Randomness 1 0.980 0.907 0.846 0.968
Steadiness 1 0.962 0.945 0.984 0.985
Reliability 1 0.967 0.938 0.997 0.991
Uniqueness 0.5 0.500 0.465 0.072 0.472
bit-Aliasing 0.5 0.500 0.466 0.195 0.505



















Fig. 7: HD histograms after robustness tests with reference to
benchmark
markers before the feature area is processed. Both the intra-
group and inter-group distributions remain largely unchanged.
As an example, if we choose HD = 0.33 as the threshold, the
FRR and FAR still maintain at 0%.
Scribbled Dataset. As compared to the benchmark dataset,
scribbling on the banknotes shifts the centre of the intra-group
distribution to the right (from 0.03 to 0.06), but it has little
effect on the inter-group distribution. This means scribbling on
a banknote adds noise to the data, but the two groups remain
clearly separated. At a threshold of HD = 0.33, the FRR and
FAR are kept at 0%.
Soaked Dataset. As shown in Figure 7, soaking a banknote
has little effect on both the intra-group and inter-group distri-
butions. This is as expected since the polymer banknotes are
water-proof by design (due to the application of clear veneer
at the outer layer). Given HD = 0.33 as the threshold, the FRR
and FAR are still 0%.
PUF Result. As shown in Table IV, the robustness tests in
our experiments have little effect on the PUF metrics. All the
values computed after the robustness tests remain close to the
ideal values. This suggests that our technique is reasonably
robust against non-ideal daily handling of banknotes. To a
large extent, the strong robustness of our method is attributed
to the basic design of a polymer note: in particular, the veneer
coating at the outer layer protects the printing underneath and
makes the polymer note highly durable against rough daily
usage.
3) Variation Tests: In the section, we study the variation of
performance under different test conditions, including the use
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TABLE IV: PUF metrics after robustness tests vs benchmark
PUF Ideal Rotated Scribbled Soaked Folded Bench.
Metrics Value Dataset Dataset Dataset Dataset Dataset
Uniformity 0.5 0.499 0.499 0.498 0.501 0.500
Randomness 1 0.981 0.980 0.978 0.978 0.980
Steadiness 1 0.960 0.960 0.971 0.949 0.962
Reliability 1 0.965 0.965 0.972 0.950 0.967
Uniqueness 0.5 0.500 0.500 0.501 0.501 0.500
bit-Aliasing 0.5 0.499 0.499 0.498 0.501 0.500














Fit Dist., Camera Set
Fit Dist., Polymer £5
Fit Dist., Paper £20
Fig. 8: Histograms of variation tests vs benchmark
TABLE V: PUF metrics after variation tests vs benchmark
PUF Ideal Camera Polymer Paper Benchmark
Metrics Value Set £5 £20 Dataset
Uniformity 0.5 0.499 0.499 0.497 0.500
Randomness 1 0.984 0.985 0.983 0.980
Steadiness 1 0.884 0.935 0.978 0.962
Reliability 1 0.900 0.944 0.981 0.967
Uniqueness 0.5 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500
bit-Aliasing 0.5 0.499 0.499 0.497 0.500
of a different imaging device, a polymer note of a different
denomination and a banknote of a different substrate. Fitted
curves for the HD histograms under these different conditions
are shown in Figure 8. Values of the PUF metrics calculated
under these conditions are summarised in Table V.
Alternative Equipment. When a camera and a light-box
are used instead of a film scanner to photograph the feature
area, the steadiness and the reliability of the obtained feature
vector slightly decrease as shown in Table V. This is also
reflected in Figure 8, in which the intra-group distribution
slightly shifts to the right. As a result, the decidability d0 is
reduced from 30 in the benchmark set to 22. This is because
the camera used in the experiment has a more complex optical
path for light reaching the CMOS sensors than the film scanner.
Furthermore, a close-up taken by a camera in the macro mode
under a close distance (about 2 cm) tends to be slightly bent
near the edge of the ring [11], which adds noise to the feature
extraction. Nonetheless, the distributions of the two groups are
still clearly separated with a maximum HD of 0.195 for the
intra-group, and a minimum HD of 0.425 for the inter-group.
The FRR and FAR remain at 0% when the threshold is set to
0.33.
Different Denominations. As compared to £10, the intra-
group HD distributions for £5 shifts to the right as shown in
Figure 8, while the inter-group distribution remains basically
unchanged. This is mainly because the £5 polymer note is
physically smaller than the £10 polymer note, and the area
suitable for feature extraction (i.e., directly exposed from
the opacity coating layer without the obstruction of security
printing) is also smaller. In our experiment, while the Gabor
filter setting is the same, the feature area defined for £5 is
only about half of the area for £10 (also see Figure 2). While
the smaller area has little impact on the PUF metrics (see
Table V), it reduces the decidability d0 from 30 to 18, and the
DoF from 900 to 854.
Different Substrates. Since paper £20 notes are still used
in the UK, we test our fingerprinting technique on £20 notes
that use paper substrate. We obtain slightly better performance
than the benchmark £10 polymer notes. The decidability d0 is
slightly increased from 30 to 32, while the DoF is increased
from 900 to 1043. The FRR and FAR remain at 0% for the
threshold of HD = 0.33.
PUF Result. The PUF metric values are basically the same
as the benchmark dataset. The slightly better performance
of £20 is related to its inherent textural patterns. As shown
in Figure 2, a paper £20 banknote also exhibits random
translucent patterns, which are caused by the random leaving
of the cotton fibre and linen rather than the opacity coating,
but the image seems to contain richer textural information than
a polymer substrate. This shows that although our technique
is designed for the anti-counterfeiting of polymer notes, it can
also be adapted to prevent forgery of traditional paper notes.
C. Limitations
Our current work has a few limitations. First all, the
data samples are taken from the UK banknotes only. Given
that the manufacturing of polymer notes follows essentially
the same process, we believe the results are applicable to
banknotes in other countries, but this needs to be confirmed
in further research. Second, we have done robustness tests
under common cases, but the tests are not exhaustive. Further
evaluation may include folding the banknote more than twice,
placing the banknote under high temperature (near the melting
point), and studying the effect of wearing out after years of
usage. Finally, the features are extracted from different areas
on banknotes of different denominations. Hence, the system
needs to identify the denomination first, which is doable but
adds an extra step in the processing. Defining a standardised
feature area for all polymer banknotes will be highly desirable.
VI. ANTI-COUNTERFEITING APPLICATIONS
A. Online Application
First of all, we propose an online application, which works
with an existing unmodified banknote. Here, we will leverage
the fact that each banknote has a unique serial number, as we
will explain below.
We divide an online application into two phrases: registra-
tion and verification. During the registration phase, a polymer
substrate fingerprint for each newly manufactured polymer
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TABLE VI: False match for one-to-one comparison
HD threshold Odds of False Match
0.3 3.5 ⇥ 10 34
0.31 6.0 ⇥ 10 31
0.32 6.7 ⇥ 10 28
0.33 5.0 ⇥ 10 25
0.34 2.5 ⇥ 10 22
0.35 8.2 ⇥ 10 20
0.36 1.9 ⇥ 10 17
0.37 2.9 ⇥ 10 15
0.38 3.0 ⇥ 10 13
0.39 2.2 ⇥ 10 11
0.4 1.1 ⇥ 10 9
banknote is extracted and recorded in a database along with
a unique serial number of the banknote. In the verification
phase, a fresh photograph of the feature area is taken and
processed into a compact 2048-bit fingerprint. The fingerprint,
along with the banknote serial number, is then sent to a remote
server through a secure channel (e.g., SSL/TLS). Based on
the serial number, the server retrieves the reference fingerprint
and compares it with the sample fingerprint against a HD
threshold. Finally, the verification result is communicated back
to the client through the existing secure channel.
Thanks to the unique serial number, the verification in the
online application is based on one-to-one comparison (rather
than one-to-many as required in exhaustive search). This is
not only extremely fast, but also gives great flexibility in
choosing a threshold. The false rejection rate of a system
heavily depends on the data acquisition environment during
the verification. On the other hand, the false acceptance rate
is essentially determined by the inherent entropy of the data
source, and we can theoretically estimate the value as follows.
Let Pa be the false acceptance rate of a fingerprint for one-
to-one comparison. Based on the 900 degrees of freedom and
the binomial distribution fitting in Figure 6, we model each
fingerprint as the result of performing a series of N = 900
Bernoulli trials with the probability p = 0.5 of guessing
‘heads’ (or ‘tails’) correctly for each trial. Hence, we can
compute Pa =
Pm
i=0 N !/ (m!(N  m)!) · pm · (1   p)N m,
where m is the number of successful guesses [12]. Given a
threshold ✓ = 0.33, m ⇡ ✓ ·N , the results are summarised in
Table VI. As shown in the table, even if we set the threshold to
be HD = 0.4 to give more tolerance to intra-group variations,
the false acceptance rate remains negligible.
B. Offline Application
An offline application differs from an online one by printing
the registration information onto a banknote rather than saving
it to a database. However, this adds an extra step of registration
to the existing banknote manufacturing process. Figure 9
summarises the process of the registration. The feature vector
extracted from the translucent patterns of a polymer substrate
is digitally signed, along with other contextual information
such as the serial number and denomination value. The private
signing key is kept securely by the authorities who issue
banknotes. In the proof-of-concept implementation, we use
ECDSA with 512 bits key length (256-bit security) for digital












Fig. 9: The Procedure of Fingerprint Registration. The QR
code shown in the diagram is generated from a real £10
polymer banknote.
and the digital signature is approximately 4420 bits, which
can be fit into a QR code (version 18) with medium error
correction (as shown in Figure 9).
Fuzzy encryption is a common technique to encrypt a
biometric sample such that it can only be decrypted by
another biometric sample taken from the same subject [14].
We could apply the same technique to encrypt the fingerprint
contained in the QR code, however, in the context of our
application, a counterfeiter always has physical access to real
banknotes which they wish to counterfeit. Hence, encrypting
the fingerprint does not offer real security benefit in our case.
For this reason, we simply save the fingerprint in its plain text
in the QR code, but we add a digital signature to protect the
integrity of data.
During the verification phase, data from the QR code is
first read, which contain a reference fingerprint, a digital
signature and other data. After the digital signature is verified
successfully by using a public key, a fresh image of the feature
area is taken and then processed into a sample fingerprint. This
fingerprint will be compared with the reference fingerprint
against a HD threshold with a binary outcome: accept or
reject. The integrity of the content in the QR code is protected
through the digital signature. If an attacker copies the same
QR code to a different banknote, the verification will fail as
the two fingerprints will not match.
VII. SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. Threat Model
We assume that the attacker knows everything about the
fingerprinting of banknotes. He knows the full state of the
device and exactly which area is used for feature extraction and
how the feature vector is computed from the feature area. We
further assume that the attacker has access to effectively the
same printing material and equipment as used for producing
legitimate banknotes. Under this assumption, the security of
the existing polymer banknotes will be easily broken. While
the security of existing banknotes is easily broken in this threat
model, we aim to provide additional security assurance such
that counterfeiting remains difficult.
The attacker has several limitations. First of all, we assume
he is unable to obtain the private signing key used by the
banknote issuing authority. Furthermore, we assume the ad-
versary is unable to physically clone the same features of a
polymer substrate. We emphasise that our security protection
is in addition, and orthogonal, to existing security features on
a banknote. In reality, a security feature is considered effective
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if it raises the cost of counterfeiting above the nominal value
of the banknote.
B. Attack on Fingerprints
Like every human being is unique (which forms the basis
of “biometrics”), every physical object is unique too (which
forms the basis of “physical unclonable function”). Under the
microscopic view, every object has distinguished features that
can not be exactly duplicated. The same applies to the polymer
substrate. Its unevenness in the opacity coating layer reflects
the imperfections during the opacity coating, which cannot
be avoided. The counterfeiter’s challenge is to make another
polymer substrate, which gives the same or sufficiently similar
feature vector as that of a genuine banknote so the same digital
signature can be reused to legitimise the counterfeit.
We argue that it is hard for the attacker to make another
polymer substrate that matches a given 2048-bit feature vector
even if he has access to the same printing material and
equipment as used by the banknote issuing authority. First of
all, the attacker needs to produce a “physical” object that looks
and feels like a legitimate polymer note. This is substantially
harder than launching spoofing attacks in “biometrics”, e.g.,
using a gummy finger to deceive a scanner in an unmanned
(unsupervised) environment. By contrast, the verification of
banknotes is usually “supervised” by nature. Visual inspection
by a human is almost always the first line of defence to
detect counterfeits, which is followed by the possible use
of tools for further confirmation such as special pens, UV
light, or in our case, a film scanner. With reference to the
gummy-finger attack, this means an attacker has to make a
real “finger” that looks and feels like a human finger to pass
the human inspection first, before it can deceive the fingerprint
scanner. This is substantially more difficult than a conventional
spoofing attack in an unsupervised environment.
The use of the “see-through” window (a security feature of
polymer notes) forces the counterfeiter to use a clear plastic
film as the substrate. With access to the same printing material
and equipment as used by the bank authorities, the attacker
will be able to produce polymer substrates that look and
feel the same as legitimate notes. However, merely producing
another substrate gives only a probability of p = 5 ⇥ 10 25
for mismatch, based on an HD threshold of 0.33 (Figure VI).
In reality, the feature vector of a second polymer substrate
does not have to match exactly that of a target substrate. It
only needs to be close enough in the Hamming space, say
less than an HD distance of 0.33. Based on the degrees of
freedom N = 900 (mean HD 0.5), and an HD threshold
of 0.33, finding a random N-bit string that is within the
w = 0.33 · N = 297 bits difference to the target string
requires the minimum number of attempts N 0 as estimated










= 4 ⇥ 1024
(15)
Note that N 0 is only a lower bound. The above result implies
that if the attacker repeats the same production process, he
must produce 4⇥1024 polymer substrates in order to find one
that might match a given digitally signed fingerprint. This is
clearly infeasible for the attacker.
The attacker might improve his chance by adding a custom-
built printing step on top of the existing banknote manufactur-
ing process. It is worth noting that printing on a plastic film
is much harder than printing on a paper substrate. The novel
idea that uses a special plastic film made of BOPP to support
high-quality security printing is precisely the key innovation
that makes polymer notes possible [3]. However, the film still
has to undergo a special opacity coating process to form a
polymer substrate, which provides a canvas to allow printing
in the subsequent procedure.
As explained earlier, the opacity coating is inherently imper-
fect, producing a layer of white ink with uneven thicknesses.
This leads to random translucent patterns when the light
shines thought the substrate. A close-up of the translucent
patterns is shown in Figure 10. As shown in the picture, the
patterns contain randomly distributed bright spots, as well as
dark spots (impurities in the ink). The physical dimensions
of these features are on the scale of a few micrometres.
As a comparison, high-resolution ink-jet printers use very
small drops (normally 17 to 50 pL volume of liquid in one
droplet [15]) to create different colours or grey levels. With a
volume of v = 17 pL, assume it forms a perfect semi-sphere
once it falls on the substrate to form a printed dot, the diameter
of the dot is d = 2 · 3
p
v · 2 · 3/4⇡ = 40 µm. However, in
reality, the droplet collides with the substrate at a high-speed,
creating a much larger dot with randomly scattering patterns
which resemble nothing like a dot under the microscopic
view (e.g., see [16]). While an ink-jet printer is physically
limited by the size of the nozzle, an attacker might use a laser
printer. However, a laser printer has its own physical limitation.
Due to the interaction of multiple rolls, a laser printer prints
uncontrollable repeated patterns at the microscopic view [17].
As an experiment, we used two high-resolution inkjet (HP
Deskjet 2700) and laser (Kyocera TASKalfa 5052ci) printers
to print a dot ‘.’ in different font sizes as shown in Figure 11.
The smallest printed size is at least one order of magnitude
larger than the size of the impurities observed in the opacity
coating layer (see Figure 10). More importantly, the printed
dots in Figure 11 exhibit random scattering patterns because
the printers cannot precisely control the nozzle or the toner at
the microscopic level.
Hence, modern printers have physical limits in what they
can print at the microscopic level. While on-top printing
can increase the opacity level, the attacker also needs to be
able to decrease the opacity level, e.g., by removing white
ink in the coating layer, so to have the full control of the
translucent patterns. This will require the attacker to acquire
much more sophisticated printing equipment than what is used
by a legitimate state government. While this is theoretically
possible, we believe it is extremely unlikely in practice, and
we leave it to further research in the future.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Vila et al. [18] were among the first to propose analysing the
infrared spectrum of a banknote to determine if it is genuine or
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Fig. 11: A printed dot ‘.’ in different font sizes using inkjet and
laser printers. The resolution for both printers is 1200 DPI.
not. They proposed to examine selected areas of the banknote
by using an infrared spectrometer, together with an attenuated
total reflectance (ATR) microscope. Their dataset consisted
of 18 randomly selected genuine notes of e 50 and e 100
denominations, and 5 counterfeit notes of e 50 and e 100
denominations, provided by the Spanish Police. Although their
experiments showed distinguishing features in the infrared
spectra between the genuine and counterfeit notes, this result
critically relied on the specific counterfeit samples used in the
study. Sonnex et al. [19] proposed a similar method based on
infrared spectroscopy. Their dataset contained 27 counterfeit
£20 notes from the Northamptonshire Police. Their study
revealed a lack of contrast in infrared spectra between ink
and paper among the forgeries. Hence, the authors proposed
to use a simple and portable infrared device to search for
spectral difference as the first line of defence, and in case
of ambiguity, use a more expensive infrared microscope to
map selected areas of printing in contrast to the background
paper. Their study has the same limitation as [18] in that the
result was only applicable to the specific counterfeit samples
used in the experiment.
Some researchers proposed to analyse the ink composition
to distinguish legitimate banknotes from counterfeits. Rusanov
et al. [20] applied Mössbauer spectroscopy to analyse the
chemical composition of the ink used in both genuine and
counterfeit banknotes. They examined 54 authentic $100 US
banknotes chosen at random, and 13 forged notes which were
provided by a bank in Bulgaria. The authors suggested that
the absence of certain elements in the pigment (e.g., green
dye sextet) could be used to distinguish counterfeit banknotes
from authentic ones. Jara et al. [21] conducted a similar study
to analyse the chemical composition of the ink in real and
fake banknotes, by using an X-ray fluorescence spectrometer
instead. Almeida et al. [22] proposed to apply Raman spec-
troscopy and chemometric tools to analyse the characterisation
of the ink in a banknote. They examined 60 counterfeit
banknotes provided by the Brazilian police, and a further set
of 28 lab-made fake samples prepared by scanning authentic
bills and printing copies on laser and ink-jet printers. Based
on the difference in the Raman spectra of the chalcographic
ink, the authors proposed to use a Partial Least Square for
Discriminant Analysis (PLS-DA) classifier to first distinguish
the counterfeits from the originals, and in case of detecting a
counterfeit, use a second classier to identify which type of the
printer was used in making the counterfeits. The performance
of their solution critically depends on the counterfeit samples
used in training the classifier. Some researchers proposed to
use an imaging device to capture the visual difference between
genuine notes and counterfeits. Yeh et al. [23] proposed to
analyse the luminance histograms of the captured image of a
banknote and apply multiple-kernel support vector machines
(SVM) to distinguish the counterfeits from the genuine notes.
The authors used a dataset of 70 genuine Taiwanese banknotes
and 29 counterfeits. Berenguel et al. [24] proposed a similar
technique to detect counterfeits by analysing the background
texture printing. A surface picture of a given banknote is
taken by using a flatbed scanner and converted to grey-scale.
Histogram features of the grey-scale image are extracted as
input to a linear SVM classifier to determine if the note is real
or not. The authors used a lab-made dataset of forgeries by
scanning genuine euro bills and then printed counterfeits with
an HP LaserJet printer. In a follow-up paper [25], Berenguel et
al. proposed a different classification method, but still used the
same procedure to generate lab-made counterfeit samples for
evaluation. All of these papers have a common limitation that
the results are only valid for the specific counterfeit samples
used in the study.
Anti-counterfeiting of banknotes is closely related to anti-
counterfeiting of documents, since paper documents such as
certificates, cheques and contracts face the same counterfeiting
problem as banknotes. Clarkson et al. [16] proposed a method
to authenticate a paper document based on the unevenness
of its surface. Based on the observation that the fuzz-mat
surface of a paper document has a unique 3-D texture structure,
they proposed to use a flatbed scanner to scan the target
document multiple times at 4 different orientations. Based on
the measurements, they created a 3-D image of the paper
surface texture, and split the image into small patches for
feature extraction. This process created a feature vector of
3200 bits as a paper fingerprint. Experiments showed that their
method was able to distinguish a genuine document from a
forged one. However, one drawback of their method is that it
requires repeated scans, and is time-consuming. In our system,
we extract features from a 2D image, and require only one scan
(or one snapshot using a camera). Sharma et al. [26] proposed
a similar technique based on analysing the speckle patterns
when light reflects on the paper surface. This follows an earlier
work by Buchanan et al. [27], which used a laser to capture the
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speckle patterns. Recently, Toreini et al. [11] proposed a new
fingerprinting technique, which captures the unique features of
a paper document using transmissive light instead of reflective
light. They showed that using the transmissive light was able
to capture richer features in the textural patterns than using
the reflective light, and hence achieve better performance than
previous works [16], [26], [27].
Our polymer substrate fingerprinting technique is inspired
by the previous research in anti-counterfeiting of banknote and
paper, but it is different in a few ways. First of all, we do
not require any dataset of forgeries for training. Instead of
merely classifying a banknote into a binary result of “real”
or “forgery” like in [18]–[25], our technique extracts a unique
fingerprint from a physical banknote. The authentication of a
banknote starts with a null hypothesis that it is a “forgery”
until this hypothesis is compellingly rejected by statistics.
The 900-bit entropy in the extracted fingerprints is higher
than previous works [11], and lays a solid foundation for
building a large-scale authentication system for both online
and offline applications. Second, we are the first to propose
utilising the imperfections in the opacity coating layer of
a polymer banknote to build an anti-counterfeiting system.
Besides the theoretical design, we have developed a complete
data acquisition and processing method, built a concrete proof-
of-concept prototype, collected an extensive dataset and con-
ducted experiments with both empirical and theoretical anal-
ysis to demonstrate the feasibility of our proposed solution.
As compared with existing security features of polymer notes,
ours has a distinctive advantage that even if the attacker has
acquired the same printing equipment and ink as used for
printing genuine banknotes, and counterfeiting remains hard.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a new anti-counterfeiting
solution for polymer notes based on analysing the imper-
fections in the opacity coating of a polymer substrate. The
imperfect coating process leaves a coating layer of uneven
thickness and randomly distributed impurities from the ink. We
propose a method to capture these imperfections and transform
them into a 2048-bit feature vector as a unique fingerprint.
Our experiments show that our solution is able to authenticate
banknotes with high accuracy, is extremely scalable, and is
robust against rough daily handling of banknotes. This makes
it a useful technique for practical use.
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